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Abstract
We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly deter-
mines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement
an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning
bidder’s information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the winning bidder only has
limited information, namely that his valuation is suffi ciently high to win the auction. The sequential
mechanism implements the allocation of the handicap auction of Eső and Szentes [10] but strength-
ens the participation constraints of the bidders from interim to posterior constraints. Due to the
limited disclosure of information, the participation constraints (and incentive constraints) of all the
bidders are satisfied with respect to all information revealed by the mechanism. In the special case
in which the bidders have no private information initially, the seller can extract the entire surplus.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
We propose a sequential auction mechanisms for a single object and a finite number of bidders
with independent private values. Importantly, the design of the mechanism encompasses the joint
determination of the allocation of the object and the disclosure of the private information.
The present analysis is motivated by the observation that in many instances the seller of an
object has considerable control over the information that the buyers have when bidding for the
object under consideration. In fact, in some auctions, the seller intentionally limits the amount
of information regarding the object sold to such an extent that they are commonly referred to as
“blind auctions”, see for example Kenney and Klein [16] and Blumenthal [4] for the licensing of
motion pictures and Kavajecz and Keim [15] for trading of large asset portfolios.
Interestingly, the relevant information is frequently disclosed sequentially and systematically
linked to the bidding mechanism. In an auction practice referred to as indicative bidding, the seller
(or an agent of the seller) initially invites “indicative”bids on the basis of a prospectus with a limited
description of the asset and subsequently grants access to additional and more precise information
only on the basis of suffi ciently strong interest as expressed in the early rounds of bidding, see Ye [21]
or Boone and Goeree [5]. Similarly, in procurement auctions, in the “request for quote”process the
buyer initially provides limited information about the project to the potential suppliers, which hand
in a quote. On the basis of this first stage of the process, selected suppliers are invited who obtain
further, more detailed information. In this procedure the improved specification of the project goes
in parallel with negotiations of prices and conditions. The number of potential suppliers is reduced
over time, until the winner is determined. Thus, in this sequential procedure suppliers learn more
about the specification (and therefore about their costs) and only those able to compete further
remain in the bidding process, see Beil and Wein [1].
Here, we shall investigate the nature of a sequential mechanism in which the seller can jointly
determine the allocation and the disclosure rule. Importantly, we shall explicitly allow for sequential
disclosure rules, i.e. disclosure rules which depend on the current (and past) bids, and hence in a
direct mechanism on the current (and past) disclosed information. The sequential mechanism that
we consider implements the allocation of the handicap auction of Eső and Szentes [10]. Beyond the
implementation, the proposed mechanisms strengthens the participation constraints of the bidders
from interim to posterior constraints. The sequential disclosure rule has the feature that each
losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder’s information is truncated from
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below. As the auction ends, the winning bidder only has limited information, namely that his
valuation is suffi ciently high to win the auction. Due to the limited disclosure of information, the
participation constraints (and the incentive constraints) of all the bidders are satisfied with respect
to all information revealed by the mechanism, hence posterior constraints in the sense of Green and
Laffont [13].
The interaction between the bidding and the disclosure process can be described within an
ascending auction format, say in the form of the Japanese button auction, in which the asking price
is raised continuously over time, see Cassady [8]. At each point in time and associated current price,
each bidder has to make a decision as to whether he is staying in the auction or exiting the auction,
i.e. whether he continues to press the button or whether he releases the button. Suppose for the
moment, that initially each bidder would only know the common prior over his possible valuations.
We may then ask how much additional information would a bidder minimally need to participate
in an effi cient bidding mechanism, i.e. a mechanism which would support the effi cient allocation of
the object across the bidders. Now, given a current price, all he would need to know is whether his
value is above or below the current price. If indeed he were in the possession of this information
at all past and hence lower price points, then the sequential disclosure policy that supports this
information structure is simply that at price p the true value p is revealed. Thus as the current
price increases, and a bidder learns his value, he will rationally drop out (at the next price point)
and the remaining bidders are those who know that their true value is above the current price. This
ascending auction terminates when all but one of the bidders have dropped out, and the remaining
bidder is the winner of the auction. The associated assignment of the object is effi cient as his value
is larger than that of everybody else. Now, given the information that he has, his expected valuation
is the conditional expectation of his value, given that it is larger than or equal to the current price
p. In the canonical ascending auction he indeed would pay p, but given his current information, his
willingness to pay is his conditional expectation, which is strictly larger than p.
From the point of view of the seller, she would like the bidders to have and hence to provide
just enough private information to identify which bidder has the largest valuation. At the same
time, she does not want to give the bidder with the largest valuation too much information on his
valuation so as to minimize the informational rent of the winning bidder. In the above procedure,
this is achieved by giving the bidder at each point in time a binary information partition by which
each bidder learns whether his valuation is above or below some threshold. The subsequent game
is such that if the valuation of the bidder lies below the threshold, it is optimal for him to exit the
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contest. Increasing the threshold for all bidders until only one bidder remains, and then charging
the winning bidder his expected valuation, conditional on the valuation being larger than the final
threshold, is the final outcome of the disclosure mechanism. Thus, each bidder learns either his true
valuation, namely a losing valuation, or that he is the winning bidder and has the largest valuation,
yet without learning its exact value.
If each bidder has private information, his type, from the very beginning of the auction, then
the procedure needs to be generalized. First, the bidders have to report their types. Then, based on
the reports, the thresholds in the sequential procedure are determined. These thresholds typically
vary with the reports and hence differ across the bidders. Otherwise, the procedure works as above.
Bidders obtain more and more information, and those who learn their true valuations exit the
process. The final winner only learns that his valuation exceeds the final threshold. The winner
will then be charged a price which is larger than this threshold but smaller than his expected value,
conceding the informational rent he obtains with regard to his interim information. Determining
the thresholds and the price is the critical step in the analysis to ensure that the bidder with the
highest "shock-adjusted virtual valuation" wins, and to ensure that truthtelling is guaranteed, both
with regard to the initial, that is interim information, and to the sequentially disclosed, that is
posterior information.
The disclosure rule controls the informativeness of the private signal about the valuation. Im-
portantly, while the seller determines the disclosure rule, the seller does not observe the realization
of the private signal of each bidder. Formally, the disclosure rule is a mapping, one for each agent,
from the value of the object to a distribution over a set of possible signals. The set of feasible
disclosure rules includes the full disclosure rule, in which each agent learns his value perfectly, and
the zero disclosure rule, in which each agent learns nothing above the common prior over the valua-
tion. Between these two extreme disclosure rules are many other feasible disclosure rules, including
deterministic and stochastic disclosure rules.1 The disclosure mechanism is subject to the standard
incentive and participation constraints of the agents. Given the disclosed private information, each
bidder has an incentive to report his private information truthfully, and given the private informa-
1Kamenica and Gentzkow [14] consider a related class of problems referred to as "Bayesian Persuasion”. They
consider the interaction between a principal and a single agent, where the principal can determine the disclosure rule,
but the allocation is determined by the agent. Thus the game is “given” rather than “designed”as in the current
analysis, but of course the action taken by the agent can be influenced through the disclosure rule adopted by the
principal.
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tion, each bidder is willing to participate, i.e. his expected net utility is at least as large as his
utility from not participating. We shall refer to these constraints as the posterior incentive and
posterior participation constraints, as each agent is conditioning his report and his participation on
the private information revealed in the disclosure mechanism. These notions of posterior constraints
were first introduced by Green and Laffont [13] to reflect the possibility that the mechanism may
reveal some, but not necessarily all, payoff-relevant information to the agents.2
1.2. Related Literature
Bergemann and Pesendorfer [2] consider the standard independent private value auction for a
single good. In a static mechanism design problem, the seller jointly determines the allocation and
the disclosure rule of the mechanism, and the design is subject to the posterior incentive and poste-
rior participation constraints. The disclosure rule of the mechanism determines the informativeness
of the private signal that each agent receives about his true value for the object. The optimal
disclosure mechanism uses a deterministic, but coarse, disclosure rule. Each agent receives only
limited information about his true value, and the resulting revenue strictly exceeds the revenue
of the full disclosure rule. The optimality of the coarse information arises from the nature of the
information rent. In the complete disclosure rule, each agent learns his true value, and while this
guarantees an effi cient allocation, it allows the agent to receive a substantial information rent. By
limiting the private information, the seller can reduce the information rent without a substantial
decrease in the effi ciency of the allocation.
Gershkov [11] reconsiders the optimal disclosure mechanism of Bergemann and Pesendorfer
[2] under a weaker participation constraint, namely the ex-ante participation constraint, while
maintaining the posterior incentive constraints. With the ex-ante participation constraint, the
seller can charge each bidder a participation fee before the release of any private information and
extract the entire expected surplus from the agents.3
In an important contribution, Eső and Szentes [10] pursue the analysis of the optimal informa-
tion disclosure in the context of an informational environment which encompasses Bergemann and
2By contrast, the ex-post incentive and participation constraints are evaluated under complete information about
the realized valuation of each agent, thus ex post. By convention, we refer to ex ante as the moment at which the
bidders only know the common prior, and to interim as the moment at which each bidder knows his own private
type.
3The nature of the solution in Gershkov [11] is reminiscent to the analysis of the effi cient regulation of a natural
monopoly offered by Demsetz [9] and Loeb and Magat [19], which suggests the ex ante sale of all future rents.
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Pesendorfer [2] and Gershkov [11]. In their model, each agent has two possible sources of private in-
formation, an initial estimate of the true value of the object, the type, and subsequently a signal that
informs him about the realization of his true value. Eső and Szentes [10] show that the additional,
or incremental information relative to the initial estimate, can be represented as a signal that is
orthogonal to, i.e. independent of, the type. Based on this representation of the private information
of each agent, namely the initial signal and the incremental and independent signal, they suggest
a sequential screening contract, in which each agent first reveals his initial information, and then
in a second step the additionally disclosed information.4 Importantly, the disclosure of the initial
estimate, the type, cannot be affected by the disclosure mechanism, it is only the disclosure of the
subsequent, orthogonal signal that is controlled by the disclosure mechanism. The design of the
optimal disclosure mechanism is subject to the posterior incentive constraints, but only the interim
participation constraints. In particular, the mechanism requires each bidder to pay a participation
fee, which modifies the probability of winning, and a transfer conditional on winning. Thus the
mechanism necessitates a payment from the losing bidders, and hence violates the posterior partic-
ipation constraints. Thus, this result leaves open the question what can be achieved under stronger
participation constraints.
Surprisingly, Eső and Szentes [10] show that the optimal disclosure mechanism is the full disclo-
sure mechanism, and show that the optimal disclosure mechanism generates as much revenue as an
optimal mechanism could in which the incremental information of each agent was observable by the
seller.5 In a recent contribution, Li and Shi [18] extend the analysis of the optimal static disclosure
mechanism by permitting the disclosure process to depend on the true value of the object, but not
on the orthogonal signal. In this case, they show that the optimal policy can involve partial and
discriminatory rather than complete and uniform information disclosure. The design of dynami-
cally optimal disclosure rules is also analyzed in sequential contracting problems such as in auctions
with resale or in vertical relationships, see e.g. Calzolari and Pavan [6], [7], and Lebrun [17]. In
these environments, the information regarding the current transaction influences the distribution
of the surplus in future transactions, and over the time the identity of the trading partner changes.
4The decomposition between the initial and the incremental signal proved, by itself, to be an important tool in
the analysis of sequential screening contracts, see Pavan, Segal, and Toikka [20] for a recent contribution on revenue
maximizing mechanism design in a general environment with an infinite time horizon.
5Gershkov [12] obtains a similar result in a setting where the incremental signal of each agents pertains to common
value component in the valuation of each bidder.
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And while the resulting disclosure policy is still primarily driven by the concern for the information
rents, the trade-offs are driven by more subtle considerations regarding the incidence of rents over
time.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we present the model and describe the sequential
disclosure mechanism. In Section 3 we analyze the case without interim private information by the
bidders; and here the first best allocation can be implemented. The general case is analyzed in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of possible extensions and applications.
2. The Model
2.1. Payoffs, Types and Signals
There is one seller with a single object for sale and there are n potential bidders, indexed by
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, which are risk-neutral and with quasi-linear utility. The seller can commit to a
mechanism to sell the object to one of the competing bidders.
The true valuation of bidder i is given by Vi ∈ Vi, where Vi is a subset of R+, which we assume
without loss of generality to be equal to the unit interval Vi = (0, 1] for all i. The prior distribution
of Vi is denoted by Hi and corresponding density hi. The valuations are independently distributed
across the agents. The cost c of producing the object for the seller is normalized without loss of
generality to 0.
Each agent receives a (noisy) signal vi of his true valuation Vi before he enters the mechanism.
We assume that the type vi is distributed, again without loss of generality on the unit interval
[0, 1] with distribution Fi and corresponding density fi. We denote by Hivi (Vi) , Hi (Vi |vi ) , the
distribution of Vi conditional on vi, with the corresponding conditional density hivi (Vi) , hi (Vi |vi ).
We refer to vi as the type, or interim information, of agent i.
In addition, each agent i may receive additional information which resolves the residual uncer-
tainty about the value Vi during the bidding process. We describe the additional information by a
random variable si ∈ Si = (0, 1] and refer to it as signal si with a given conditional distribution
Givi (si) , Gi (si |vi ). By observing the signal si (together with type vi) the bidder learns his true
valuation Vi, or
Vi , ui(vi, si).
2.2. Sequential Mechanism
We consider a specific sequential disclosure and allocation mechanism that ends with the allo-
cation of the object. The mechanism itself is an indirect mechanism that embeds the disclosure
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process in an ascending auction. The indirect mechanism is specifically tailored to implement the
allocation of the handicap auction of Eső and Szentes [10] with posterior participation constraints.
As such, it does not attempt to find the revenue maximizing mechanism for all possible disclosure
policies, and in particular, it does not attempt to provide a dynamic counterpart to the static
analysis of Li and Shi [18].
The disclosure component of the mechanism determines the time by which the signal si is
revealed. The allocation component determines the final allocation of and payments for the object.
As in the ascending auction, the object is awarded to the final active bidder. Importantly, the seller
can commit to a disclosure mechanism that determines when and how the information contained
in the signal si is disclosed to bidder i. And while the seller determines the disclosure mechanism,
the realized information remains private information to each bidder i. The specific disclosure of the
random variable si is sequential in that the disclosure mechanism determines for every realization
of the signal si the time at which the realization is disclosed. In particular, higher realizations of si
are going to be disclosed later in time.
Disclosure. The sequential mechanism asks each bidder to initially report his type vi and then to
report his signal realization si as soon as it is disclosed by the mechanism. The disclosure part of
the mechanism determines the time t ∈ [0, 1] at which the signal realization si is disclosed. We first
define the sequential disclosure component which determines the time at which the signal realization
si is disclosed. For every agent i, we define a disclosure function ξi , ξi (t, v̂i, si),
ξi : [0, 1]× [0, 1]× (0, 1]→ [0, 1] , (1)
which determines the disclosure of the signal realization as a function of time t ∈ [0, 1], reported
type v̂i ∈ [0, 1] and signal realization si ∈ (0, 1]. The disclosure function ξi is assumed to be a step
function in time t, with a single jump, from 0 (which represents the event of no signal disclosure
yet) to si > 0 at a particular disclosure time ti (v̂i, si),
ti (v̂i, si) , min {t ∈ [0, 1] |ξi (t, v̂i, si) > 0} ,
and constant everywhere else in t. Thus the disclosure time ti (v̂i, si) is the time at which the signal
realization si is disclosed to bidder i given a reported type v̂i. The state of the disclosure process
at time t, given by ξi (t, v̂i, si), is privately observed by bidder i, and it is either 0 (which means
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disclosure has not yet occurred) or si (which means disclosure has occurred).6
Reporting Strategy. A reporting (or message) strategy mi = (ri, di) of bidder i consists of an initial
report ri and a (continued) participation decision di for bidder i. The strategy of each bidder i
depends on the private state (or history) of bidder i. The private history of bidder i at t = 0 is
simply his type vi, or h0i = (vi) and at all subsequent times t > 0, his type vi, his reported type v̂i
and the state of the disclosure process ξi (t, v̂i, si), thus h
t
i = (vi, v̂i, ξi (t, v̂i, si)). Formally, then the
initial report ri , ri (vi) is defined as a mapping,
ri : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] , (2)
and the participation (or continuation) decision di , di (t, vi, v̂i, ξi (t, vi, si)) with
di : [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ {0, 1} . (3)
The decision of the bidder is either to stay in the bidding process: di (·) = 1 or to exit the bidding
process: di (·) = 0. The participation decision depends on the time t ∈ [0, 1], the true type vi,
the reported type v̂i ∈ [0, 1], and the state of the disclosure process ξi (t, v̂i, si) ∈ [0, 1]. The exit
decision is irrevocable, and hence di, as a function of time, is restricted to be weakly decreasing in
t.
Allocation. The object is assigned as soon as all but one of the bidders have exited the bidding
process. As time t progresses, we can track the exit decision of the agents. At time t < 1, agent i
has exited the bidding process if the exit time τ i (t) of bidder i,
τ i (t) , min {{t′ ≤ t |di (t′, ·) = 0} ∧ 1} , (4)
satisfies τ i (t) ≤ t. To wit, if the agent has not yet exited, then at time t, he is assigned the exit
time 1, which simply represents the fact that at t he is still active. For bidder i, the disclosure
process ξi (·) stops as soon as he exits the auction, or ξi (t, v̂i, si) = ξi (τ i, v̂i, si) for all t ≥ τ i.
The mechanism determines the allocation at the first time, τ , at which all but one of the agents
have exited the auction:
τ , min {t > 0 |∃k, s. th. τ j (t) ≤ t,∀j 6= k, τ k (t) > t} .
6We restrict si and Vi to the half-open interval (0, 1] (rather than the closed interval [0, 1]) for the sole purpose
of identifying the report ξi (·) = 0 with the event of no signal disclosure yet.
9
This definition of the stopping time (and the subsequent definition of the allocation rule) excludes
events in which all of the remaining bidders stop at the same time.7
The assignment of the object is described by a probability vector x = (x1, ..., xn), and the
assignment probabilities xi,
xi : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ {0, 1} , (5)
are required to sum to less than or equal to one. The allocation itself depends only on the exit time
τ i of bidder i and the stopping time τ of the auction, i.e.
xi (τ i, τ) , 0⇔ τ i ≤ τ , xi (τ i, τ) , 1⇔ τ i > τ.
Similarly, the transfers are described by a vector p = (p1, ..., pn), where each pi is determined by a
mapping:
pi : [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R+. (6)
The transfer payments will have the property that only the winning bidder is making a positive
payment, i.e. pi (v̂i, τ i, τ) = 0 if τ i ≤ τ , and that the payment of the winning bidder will only
depend on his initial report v̂i ∈ [0, 1], and the stopping time τ ∈ [0, 1].





r∗i (vi) , vi,
and
d∗i (t, vi, vi, ξi (t, vi, si)) ,
{
1, if ξi = 0;
0, if ξi > 0.
In other words, each agent reports truthfully his own type, and then stays in the bidding process
as long as he has not yet received the additional signal si, and exits as soon as a signal has been
received. We refer to this as “truthtelling”behavior as the individual exit time reveals the value of
the signal.
In the sequential mechanism, we determined the allocation xi and the payment pi in terms of
the exit time τ i, the stopping time τ , and the reported type v̂i, (5) and (6) respectively. Now, the
exit time and the stopping time are induced by the reporting strategies of all the players, and to
7These are zero probability events and hence can be omitted without loss of generality. At the expense of
additional notation, we could complete the description by introducing a uniform random allocation in case of such a
zero probability event, essentially a tied bid.
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make this dependence explicit we can express allocations and transfer payments directly in terms
of the message profile m = (mi,m−i) in the obvious way:
Xi (mi,m−i) , xi (τ i (mi) , τ (m)) , Pi (mi,m−i) , pi (vi (mi) , τ i (mi) , τ (m)) . (7)
We can now define the posterior incentive and participation constraints. We require that truthtelling














) ∣∣hti ] ≥ E [Xi (mi,m∗−i)Vi − Pi (mi,m∗−i) ∣∣hti ] ,∀mi,∀hti, (8)















) ∣∣hti ] ≥ 0, ∀hti. (9)
The incentive constraints given by (8) thus cover the reporting behavior of each agent for the entire
history of the mechanism. But, of course the reporting is subject to the rules of the mechanism,
namely the initial report v̂i and any exit decision during the disclosure process are irrevocable.
In particular, the above incentive and participation constraints imply that the initial set of con-
straints, the interim, and the terminal participation and incentive, the posterior constraints are
satisfied; namely at t = 0 when each agent only observes his type vi: h0i = vi, and at t = τ when the
mechanism terminates with the allocation of the object. In fact, the notion of posterior implemen-
tation evaluates the constraints at all private histories (information sets) that can be reached in the
mechanism. Thus the set of constraints are determined by the mechanism itself, and in this sense
“endogenous”to mechanism. To the extent then that the mechanism does not reveal all possible
information about the true willingness to pay of the bidders, as it will typically be the case, the
constraints are weaker than the ex-post constraints which would apply if all the private information
had become public. The subsequent results of the posterior implementation, Proposition 1 and 2,
establish that the participation constraints can be substantially strengthened if the constraints are
“measurable”with respect to all disclosed information, but not beyond that. In the present context
of the optimal auction, it means that the seller does not have to use participation payments, but
rather can rely exclusively on transaction payments. In other words, the commitment power of the
bidders can be substantially weakened in the sense that the commitment of bidder is only required
at the time of the assignment of the object rather at the very beginning of the bidding process.
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Summary of Sequential Mechanism. We summarize the sequential mechanism as follows. For each
bidder i, nature initially draws (vi, si). Bidder i initially observes vi but not si. Bidder i reports
v̂i , ri(vi) according to the reporting strategy ri(·) (whether or not v̂i = vi). Then, the disclosure
policy ξi(·) uses the reported type v̂i (and not the true type vi) and the signal si to generate the
disclosure time t(v̂i, si). At any point of time t, the bidder either knows that si > s′i for the critical
signal s′i such that t = t(v̂i, s
′
i) or that the value is si, namely if t(v̂i, si) ≤ t.
The allocation mechanism is thus a version of an ascending auction, in the format of the
“Japanese” or “button” auction in which the price uniformly increases over time. In the but-
ton auction, if a bidder releases the button, he reveals his type, and the auction ends for him.
The ascending disclosure mechanism modifies the button auction in two important aspects: (i) it
associates a disclosure process with the price process, (ii) the final price paid is personalized, and
related to, but not necessarily equal to the valuation of the final remaining competitor.
3. Bidding without Interim Information
We begin our analysis with bidders who do not possess interim private information. In other
words, the initial information of each agent is simply the common prior H = (Hi)
n
i=1 over the
valuations V = (Vi)
n
i=1. This informational environment with uninformed bidders was analyzed by
Bergemann and Pesendorfer [2], but they restricted attention to static disclosure mechanisms. In
this section we revisit their setting but allow for the possibility of sequential information disclosure.
The purpose of this section is to present a simple and hopefully transparent environment to un-
derstand how information disclosure, effi ciency, and revenue extraction are naturally linked in the
ascending mechanism.
We now adapt (and simplify) the sequential mechanism, defined earlier by (1), (5) and (6) to
the present environment. In particular, without interim information vi, the disclosure function can
depend on time t and signal si alone, and without loss of generality, we take the signal si to be
equal to the valuation Vi. With this, the disclosure function ξi is given by
ξi : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] , (10)
which determines the disclosure of the valuation as a function of time t ∈ [0, 1] and of the valuation
Vi ∈ [0, 1].




be identical for all of the agents and define
ξi (t, Vi) ,
{
0, if t < Vi;
Vi, if t ≥ Vi.
(11)
Thus, bidder i with valuation Vi receives a perfectly informative signal about his valuation at t = Vi,
whereas at all times t with t < Vi, he will infer that his expected valuation is given by the conditional
expectation, E [Vi |Vi ≥ t ].
The assignment of the object to agent i depends only on his exit time τ i and the stopping time
τ ,
xi (τ i, τ) ,
{
0, if τ i ≤ τ ;
1, if τ i > τ.
(12)
The transfer payments request a single positive payment pi at the stopping time τ from the winning
bidder only:
pi (τ i, τ) ,
{
0, if τ i ≤ τ ;
E [Vi |Vi ≥ τ ] , if τ i > τ.
(13)
A sequential mechanism is then defined by (11)-(13), and we shall refer to it as the ascending
disclosure mechanism.
It is then optimal for the bidder to stay in the bidding process if no information has been
revealed: ξi (t, ·) = 0; and to exit if information has been disclosed: ξi (t, ·) = Vi. We can now state
our first result in the setting with bidders without interim information.
Proposition 1. The ascending disclosure mechanism satisfies the posterior incentive and partici-
pation constraints for all agents and the seller extracts the entire social surplus.
Proof. We first observe that if all the bidders follow the truthtelling strategy, then the posterior
participation constraint is satisfied for the losing and the winning bidders. A losing bidder does
not receive the object, see allocation rule (12), and by the payment rule (13) faces a zero payment,
and hence his net utility is equal to zero. The winning bidder receives the object with probability
one, see allocation rule (12), but given the payment rule (13) has to pay his expected conditional
valuation at the stopping time τ . Thus, again, given the information disclosed by the mechanism at
time τ , the net utility of the winning bidder is zero, and hence the posterior participation constraint
is satisfied.
We then consider the posterior incentive constraints in the ascending disclosure mechanism.
Every losing bidder learns his value and immediately exits to receive a net utility of zero. Clearly,
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exiting before learning the valuation Vi does not improve the net utility of bidder i, as bidder i
would merely exit earlier, and still receive zero net utility. But if he were to stay longer, and not
stop his own disclosure process, then the auction could reach the stopping point τ > τ i = Vi, and
ask bidder i to pay more than his true valuation. Clearly, this does not improve his net utility
either. Finally, consider the winning bidder. He cannot change the price conditional on winning,
he can only lower his probability of winning by exiting the auction before his valuation is revealed.
But if he were to exit the auction, he would receive zero net utility as well, thus exiting early does
not constitute a profitable deviation either. Thus staying in the mechanism is an optimal strategy.
Finally, let us consider the revenue of the ascending disclosure mechanism. The seller receives
revenue from bidder i when all the other bidders have a valuation below him. Thus, the allocation
is effi cient, and as every bidder, winning or losing receive zero expected utility, it follows that the
seller receives the entire social surplus.
We observe that in the ascending disclosure mechanism, the participation and incentive con-
straints of the losing bidders are not merely satisfied as posterior constraints, but even hold as ex
post constraints. In other words, given the truthful reports of all the agents, a losing bidder would
not want to change his reporting behavior, even after he learned his true valuation Vi. In contrast,
for the winning bidder, the surplus extraction result crucially relies on the fact that the winning
bidder does not learn his true valuation Vi, but rather is limited to knowing that his true valuation
is in the interval [τ , 1] and hence forms his conditional expectation on the basis of the disclosed
information.
Having shown that with ex-ante uninformed bidders, the ascending information disclosure leads
to the revenue maximizing allocation, we now generalize the procedure to the case where the bidders
have some private, or interim, information before they enter the mechanism.
4. Bidding with Interim Information
We now turn to the general model in which each bidder i receives a noisy signal vi of his valuation
Vi, his interim information. We provide a sequential implementation of the static mechanism in Eső
and Szentes [10] that differs in two essential aspects from their implementation: (i) the signal si
is not completely disclosed, and (ii) the participation constraint of each bidder is satisfied at the
posterior level rather than merely at the interim level.
We maintain the informational environment in Eső and Szentes [10], namely that the density
fi (vi) associated with the distribution Fi (vi) of the buyer’s type vi is positive everywhere and
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that the distribution satisfies the monotone hazard condition, that is fi (vi) / (1− Fi (vi)) is weakly
increasing in vi. In addition, the relationship between the initial type and final valuation, namely
(∂Hivi (Vi) /∂vi) /hivi (Vi) is assumed to be increasing in vi and Vi. Finally, we adopt their orthogonal
representation that the signal si simply represents the percentile of the true valuation and thus write
si as
si , si(vi, Vi) = Hivi(Vi). (14)
As si is the percentile of the true valuation conditional on the type vi, the distribution Givi (si) of
si conditional on vi is simply the uniform distribution on [0, 1] for all vi.
We proceed in three steps. In Subsection 4.1, we recall the relevant aspects of the revenue
maximizing allocation in which the signal profile s is directly observable by the seller, as derived by
Eső and Szentes [10]. In Subsection 4.2, we present the ascending disclosure mechanism with interim
information. In Subsection 4.3, we show that the ascending disclosure mechanism implements the
revenue maximizing allocation with posterior incentive and participation constraints.
A Caveat: Disclosure Contingent on si versus Vi. We represent the additional information about
Vi contained in the signal si relative to type vi by means of an orthogonal random variable as first
suggested by Eső and Szentes [10]. And like them, we restrict the disclosure policy of the seller
to use information about the signal si only. We should emphasize that the representation of the
additional information in form of an orthogonal signal is indeed without loss of generality. By
contrast, the requirement that the disclosure policy is contingent on the reported type v̂i and the
signal si only (as in (1)), rather than on the true value Vi is a substantial restriction. In a recent
paper, Li and Shi [18] consider static disclosure policies in which the disclosure policy of the seller is
allowed to use information about the value Vi itself rather than si (and the reported type v̂i) only.
In particular, they give an example, their Example 4, in which the disclosure policy based on the
true value Vi strictly dominates any disclosure policy based on si alone. However we believe that
the present arguments regarding the benefits of sequential relative to static disclosure mechanisms
remain valid after allowing for policies contingent on Vi rather than si. We shall detail our view at
the end of Section 5.
4.1. Observable Signal
The benchmark case is the situation where the seller can observe the signal si of each bidder.
Eső and Szentes [10] show that in the second best, where the seller can observe the so-called ’shocks’
si, the optimal mechanism has the following property: the object is rewarded to the bidder with
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the largest non-negative "shock adjusted virtual valuation" Wi(vi, si),




where ui1(vi, si) is the partial derivative of ui(vi, si) with respect to vi, thus the impulse response of
ui with respect to vi. We next describe some properties of the virtual valuation.8
Lemma 1 (Virtual Valuation).
1. The virtual valuation Wi (vi, si) is strictly increasing in vi and si;
2. If ui (vi, si) = ui (v′i, s
′
i) and vi ≥ v′i, then Wi (vi, si) ≥ Wi (v′i, s′i) ;
3. If Wi (vi, si) = Wi (v′i, s
′
i) and vi ≥ v′i, then ui (vi, si) ≤ ui (v′i, s′i) .
Proof. (1.)-(3.) follow directly from Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 of Eső and Szentes [10].
The monotonicity of the virtual utility Wi (vi, si) implies that for a given vector of types v =
(v1, ..., vn) and vector of signals s−i = (s1, .., si−1, si+1, ..., sn), bidder i obtains the good whenever
his signal si is larger than a threshold value si (v, s−i) of the signal si. This threshold is defined as
si (v, s−i) , min {min {si ∈ [0, 1]|Wi (vi, si) ≥ 0 and ∀j 6= i, Wi (vi, si) ≥ Wj (vj, sj)} , 1} . (16)
Above we take the minimum over si and 1, as vi might be small, and hence there might be no
signal si ∈ [0, 1] that would turn bidder i into a winner. Given that the virtual valuation only
depends on v and s and in particular is not a function of the distributional property of s, we can
construct the optimal (static) mechanism for every realization of s. The optimal allocation is then
determined by the virtual valuations and the bidder obtains the good whenever his type is larger
than the threshold vi (v−i, s),
vi (v−i, s) , min {min {vi ∈ [0, 1]|Wi (vi, si) ≥ 0 and ∀j 6= i, Wi (vi, si) ≥ Wj (vj, sj)} , 1} . (17)
We construct incentive compatible transfers, which are only paid in case of winning, by asking the
winner to pay the valuation of the lowest type vi (v−i, s), given the signals s, which would have won
the contest,





The payment pi (v−i, s) therefore has the Vickrey property that the payment of winner i is indepen-
dent of his true type vi, conditional on the event vi ≥ vi(v−i, s). Thus, the payment rule described
by (18) implements truthtelling with respect to vi if the signals (s1, ..., sn) are publicly revealed.
8If the seller has a strictly positive cost c of providing the good, then the object is assigned if and only if the
largest shock-adjusted virtual valuation is larger than c, and no further changes are necessary.
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4.2. Ascending Disclosure Mechanism
We now turn to the case where the additional signal s is unobservable to the seller. We next con-
struct the sequential information disclosure with the important property that the virtual valuations
of all active bidders are equalized at all times t until bidding ends at τ . Given the initial reports
of all bidders, truthful or not, we reveal to each bidder i whether his signal si is above a current
threshold at a speed such that at all times the virtual utility of all active bidders evaluated at the
current threshold are identical. In this context, the initial report v̂i of bidder i simply determines
the speed at which the disclosure process is running through the signals. Formally, we explicitly
define the disclosure function ξi (t, v̂i, si) through the virtual valuation Wi(v̂i, si) and the associated
disclosure time ti (v̂i, si) for all i, v̂i, si,
ti (v̂i, si) ,
{
0, if Wi(v̂i, si) < 0;
Wi(v̂i, si), if Wi(v̂i, si) ≥ 0;
(19)
and thus
ξi (t, v̂i, si) =
{
0, if t < ti (v̂i, si) ;
si, if t ≥ ti (v̂i, si) .
(20)
The disclosure time ti (v̂i, si) is thus strictly increasing in both the reported type v̂i and the signal
realization si. Thus, a higher reported type slows down the disclosure of information, and a higher
realizations of si is going to be disclosed later than a low realization of si. In this sense, the initial
report v̂i influences the speed of disclosure, and as time goes by, the bidder continues to update his
estimate, even in the absence of a disclosed signal. The disclosure function ξi and disclosure time
ti for different realization of the type vi and signal si are illustrated in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1: Disclosure function ξi and disclosure time ti here.
We use the static payments (18) in the ascending mechanism, but only via the (conditioning)
information available at the stopping time τ . The individual exit times of the losing bidders, τ j ≤ τ ,
implicitly define the reported signal realizations ŝj via (19), namely
Wj (v̂j, ŝj) = τ j.
Thus, the winning bidder i pays for all realizations of si above the threshold si (v̂, ŝ−i), and we
define the transfer function Pi (v̂, ŝ−i) as
Pi(v̂, ŝ−i) , E
[
pi (v̂−i, ŝ)
∣∣si ≥ si (v̂, ŝ−i)] . (21)
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The winning bidder pays in expectations now as much as he would in the static mechanism with
observable signals.
If we consider the allocation and payment rules, as encoded by (16) and (18), then it is apparent
that all the decisions with respect to bidder i, whether they concern the disclosure of information
or the allocation, only depend on the competing bidders in a very limited way; namely via the
largest virtual utility among the competing bidders. Thus, to the extent that the other bidders are
truthtelling, a suffi cient statistic of the profile (v−i, s−i) is the resulting maximal virtual utility
w(v−i, s−i) , max
j 6=i
{Wj (vj, sj) , 0} .
It follows that to verify the posterior incentive and participation constraints of bidder i, it is entirely
suffi cient to represent the competitors via a distribution of competing (maximal) virtual utilities
w, which we denote by G (w). For the remainder of this section, it will therefore be suffi cient to
consider a single agent competing against a virtual valuation w. In consequence we can drop the
subscripts everywhere and rewrite the relevant notation, in particular (18) and (17):
s (v̂, w) , min {s|W (v̂, s) ≥ max{w, 0}} , (22)
and
v (s, w) , min {v|W (v, s) ≥ max{w, 0}} . (23)
Consequently, the transfer payment given by (18) can be written as
p (s, w) , u (v (s, w) , s) , (24)
where the transfer has a Vickrey property with respect to v but not with respect to s.
Now, as s is not observable in the ascending disclosure mechanism, if the bidder with a reported
type v̂ wins against the virtual valuation of w, then his true signal s has to be suffi ciently high,
namely s ≥ s (v̂, w), and the transfer payment is formed by the conditional expectation
P (v̂, w) , E [p (s, w) |s ≥ s (v̂, w) ] = 1
1− s (v̂, w)
∫ 1
s(v̂,w)
u (v (s, w) , s) ds, (25)
where here and in all future integral expressions, we use the property that s is uniformly distributed
on the unit interval. By the construction of the payment P (v̂, w) in (25), it follows that
p (s (v̂, w) , w) ≤ P (v̂, w) , (26)
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as well as
u (v̂, s (v̂, w))− P (v̂, w) ≤ 0, (27)
where we note that by construction v̂ = v (s (v̂, w) , w). For later use, we collect some properties of
the threshold signal and the payment.
Lemma 2 (Payment and Signal Threshold).
1. If v > v′, then s (v, w) < s (v′, w) for all w.
2. p (s, w) is increasing in s and w.
3. P (v, w) is increasing in w and decreasing in v.
Proof. (1.) By Lemma 1, the virtual valuation is strictly increasing in v and s, and hence it
follows that the signal thresholds s (·, w) have to have the reverse ranking of v.
(2.) The transfer function p (s, w) is given by u (v (s, w) , s), see (24). By Lemma 1, it follows
that if s is increasing, then u (v (s, w) , s) is increasing as well. By Lemma 1, W (v, s) is strictly
increasing in v and s, and hence v (s, w) is increasing in w, and since u (v, s) is increasing in v, the
result follows.
(3.) For a given v, the transfer function P (v, w), see (25), is defined as a conditional expectation
over all signal realization s above a threshold s (v, w). This threshold is increasing in w by the
monotonicity of W (v, s), see Lemma 1. But by the previous argument, (2.), p (s, w) is increasing
in both s and w, and hence the conditional expectation over p (s, w) is increasing in w. After all,
an increase in w raises the expectation, given that the function p (s, w) is increasing in s for a given
w, but also the function p (·, w) is shifted upwards by a shift in w.
For a given w, the transfer function P (v, w), is defined as a conditional expectation over all
signal realization s above a threshold s (v, w). This threshold is decreasing in v by the monotonicity
of W (v, s), see Lemma 1. But by the previous argument, (2.), p (s, w) is increasing in s, and hence
the conditional expectation over p (s, w) is decreasing in v.
4.3. Posterior Implementation
We now establish that the ascending disclosure mechanism leads to truthtelling with respect to
v and s. This will establish our main result:
Proposition 2 (Posterior Implementation).
The ascending disclosure mechanism satisfies the posterior incentive and participation constraints
for all agents. The seller extracts as much revenue as in the revenue maximizing auction with
observable signals.
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The proof proceeds in several steps. We show in Lemma 3 that if the bidder reports both his type
and his signal truthfully, then he obtains the same allocation and expected utility as in the revenue
maximizing mechanism of Eső and Szentes [10]. In Lemma 4 we show that if the bidder reports his
type v truthfully, then he will also report his signal s truthfully, that is he will exit the process as
soon as he learns his true signal s. Then, Lemma 5 establishes that if the bidder reports his signal
s truthfully, he will also report his type v truthfully. The final step of the argument, presented in
Lemma 6, shows that lying both with respect to the type and the signal is not profitable either.
Lemma 3 (Revenue Equivalence).
Given truthtelling of (v, s), the allocation and the expected net utility is identical to the revenue
maximizing mechanism with observable signals.
Proof. The equivalence follows directly from the stipulated behavior at (23) and the expected




[u (v, s)− u (v (s, w) , s)] dG (w)
]
ds. (28)




[u (v, s)− u (v (s, w) , s)]
]
dsdG (w) . (29)
The equivalence of (28) and (29) now follows after exchanging the order of integration.
We can now verify that every agent reports his information truthfully in equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (Truthful Signal Report).
Given truthtelling of type v, the bidder is truthtelling about signal s.
Proof. Suppose the sequential procedure reaches w and s > s(v, w), then we assign the object
to the bidder and ask him to pay





u (v (s, w) , s) ds,





[u (v, s)− u (v (s, w) , s)] ds. (30)
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and hence for all s > s(v, w),
u (v, s)− u (v (s, w) , s) > 0,
since v > v(s, w), and thus the bidder expects a positive utility, and is staying in the auction.
On the other hand, suppose he were to learn that his true signal is s = s(v, w), then he would
quit the auction immediately, because his expected utility if he were to win at some later point
w′ ≥ w is given by:
u (v, s(v, w))− P (v, w′) ≤ u (v, s(v, w))− P (v, w)
= u (v, s(v, w))−
∫ 1
s(v,w)
u (v (s, w) , s)
ds
1− s(v, w) ≤ 0.
Now,
u (v, s(v, w))− u (v (s′, w) , s′) < 0,
since with s′ > s(v, w) and v′ < v such that u (v, s(v, w)) = u (v′, s′), W (v, s(v, w)) > W (v′, s′), by
Lemma 1. But this means that v (s′, w) > v′, and hence
u (v, s(v, w))− u (v (s′, w) , s′) < u (v, s(v, w))− u (v′, s′) = 0,
which completes the proof.
We are now in a position to verify that, conditional on reporting truthfully in the ascending
auction, each bidder is also willing to report truthfully about his type v.
Lemma 5 (Truthful Type Report).
Given truthtelling of the signal s, the bidder is truthtelling about his type v.
Proof. Suppose for now that the bidder knows the value of w. Suppose also that the bidder
misreports v̂ 6= v but continues to report his signal truthfully, that is he exits whenever his signal
s has been disclosed to him, i.e. d (t, v, v̂, ξ (t, v̂, s)) = 0 if and only if ξ (t, v̂, s) > 0. Then, the
agent will fail to win the object if s < s(v̂, w), which happens with probability s(v̂, w). Now, if
s(v̂, w) = 1, then the proof is complete, since in this case this deviation yields a zero net payoff,
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and thus not profitable. Now suppose that s(v̂, w) < 1. The agent wins the auction if s ≥ s(v̂, w)






Therefore, his ex-ante expected payment is∫ 1
s(v̂,w)
u(v(s, w), s)ds.






so that his ex-ante net expected utility is∫ 1
s(v̂,w)
[u(v, s)− u(v(s, w), s)] ds. (31)
Note that u(v, s)− u(v(s, w), s) ≥ 0 if and only if v ≥ v(s, w), and in turn
W (v, s) ≥ W (v(s, w), s) = W (v, s(v, w))
if and only if s(v, w) ≤ s. Therefore, the integral (31) is maximized if it is performed only on the
interval on which the integrand is non-negative, which is by construction [s(v, w), 1]. In other words,
setting v̂ = v maximizes this integral. Since this holds for any w, it must also hold in expectation
over all w.
For further analysis it is worth noting that the above proof establishes that reporting the true
type is not just optimal in expectation over all possible competing virtual valuations w, but in
fact for each realization of the virtual valuation w. The initial report v̂ determines the speed by
which the bidder runs through his signals. Now, for every w, an overreport is associated with a
lower threshold for the critical signal s(v, w) by Lemma 2: v̂ > v ⇔ s(v̂, w) < s(v, w). Similarly,
for every w, an underreport is associated with a higher threshold for the critical signal s(v, w)
by Lemma 2: v̂ < v ⇔ s(v̂, w) > s(v, w). Thus, if the bidder overreports his type, v̂ > v, the
disclosure process ends earlier for the bidder, as the threshold for the disclosed signals s is lower,
s(v̂, w) < s(v, w). Thus, the bidder receives less private information, than if he were to report
truthfully. By contrast, if the bidder underreports his type, v̂ < v, then the disclosure process ends
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later for the bidder, as the threshold for the disclosed signals is higher, s(v̂, w) > s(v, w). The initial
reporting strategy of the bidder therefore influences the amount of private information that he will
receive in the disclosure process. But the next result establishes that the advantage of increasing or
decreasing the information is offset by less favorable transfer payments associated with underreports
and overreports, respectively.
Lemma 6 (Joint Deviations).
The bidder cannot increase his utility by overreporting v̂ > v or by underreporting v̂ < v.
Proof. We fix w and consider the utility the bidder obtains as a function of his own signal s,
if observed. We claim that for any misreport, the bidder obtains a lower utility for every w than
he would have obtained reporting his true type. We begin with overreporting v̂ > v ⇔ s(v̂, w) <
s(v, w). It is useful to consider two separate cases, and thus let
V + , {v ∈ [0, 1]|v̂ ≥ v and the bidder wants the object upon learning that s > s(v̂, w)}, (32)
and conversely let
V − , {v ∈ [0, 1]|v̂ ≥ v and the bidder rejects the object upon learning that s > s(v̂, w)}. (33)
Note that the agent prefers to receive the object upon learning that s > s(v̂, w) if and only if




[u(v, s)− u(v(s, w), s)] ds ≥ 0.
Now suppose that v̂ ∈ V − and the agent learns that s ≤ s(v̂, w), and hence s ≤ s(v̂, w) < s(v, w),
then it is optimal for the bidder to exit after s has been revealed. After all, by overreporting v̂ > v,
it follows that u (v̂, s) > u (v, s), for all s. But if s ≤ s(v̂, w), then by (27), u (v̂, s) − P (v̂, w) < 0,
and hence it follows that u (v, s)− P (v̂, w) < 0 as well, and thus exit is an optimal response, with
the resulting zero net expected utility. If v̂ ∈ V − and s > s(v̂, w), then the agent will refrain from
claiming the object by construction of (33), as well. Therefore, any deviation v̂ ∈ V − is unprofitable.
Now suppose that v̂ ∈ V +. Again, if s ≤ s(v̂, w), then the agent will truthfully refrain from
claiming the object. If s > s(v̂, w), then he will truthfully claim the object by construction.
Therefore, if v̂ ∈ V +, then the bidder will optimally report his signal truthfully in the second stage
for any realization of the signal. Now if v̂ ∈ V +\{v} would constitute a strictly profitable deviation,
then we would have established a contradiction to Lemma 5, which established the optimality of
truthtelling of the type, given thruthtelling of the signal.
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Next consider the case of underreporting: v̂ < v ⇔ s(v̂, w) > s(v, w). This implies that the
bidder will learn more as compared to the case where he reported truthfully. If the signal s is
suffi ciently small, then s ≤ s(v, w) < s(v̂, w). Now, we observe that if the true signal had been
s = s(v, w), then the bidder would not want to receive the object if offered at P (v, w), since
u (v, s(v, w))− P (v, w) < 0,
and by Lemma 2, P (v̂, w) > P (v, w), and a fortiori would want to drop out of the auction. Suppose
then that the true signal s is suffi ciently large, or s > s(v, w). Now, there must exist a signal s̃
with s(v, w) < s̃ ≤ s(v̂, w) such that the bidder buys the good (for the given w) if and only if his
true signal is above s̃. Now, consider a type ṽ with W (ṽ, s̃) = w. By construction, the bidder who
underreported v to v̂ obtains the object for the same set of signals as the truthful type ṽ would have.
Note, however, that the payment of the type v who underreports to v̂ is larger than the payment
of the ṽ type, again by Lemma 2. So, the utility of the bidder with type v, who underreports with
regard to his type, and then behaves optimally with regard to his reported signal is smaller than
if the bidder still underreported to ṽ and then reported his signal truthfully. But given Lemma 5,
even the resulting net utility is smaller than the bidder would obtain if he were to report his type
truthfully. Thus underreporting is not profitable either.
In the working paper, Bergemann and Wambach [3], we present an explicit solution with a single
buyer and a utility function that is additive in the type v and the signal s. The example illustrates
the impact of the sequential information disclosure on the reporting incentives and the structure of
payments and compares the transfers in the static disclosure environment of Eső and Szentes [10]
with the transfers in the sequential disclosure environment.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We extend the canonical single unit auction design to allow the seller to control the information
that the bidder can receive about the object during the bidding contest. We exhibit a sequential
disclosure mechanism associated with a sequential bidding mechanism which allowed the seller to
extract almost the entire surplus of the allocation. The information rent of each bidder is restricted
to the private information that each bidder was endowed with before entering the auction. The se-
quential disclosure process allowed us to assign the object in such a way as to maintain the posterior
incentive and participation constraints of all the bidders. The disclosure mechanism allowed each
bidder to obtain a suffi cient amount of private information to find out whether his virtual valuation
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is larger or smaller than those of their competitors. Importantly, the winning bidder only learns the
lower bound of his virtual utility, but never his exact valuation nor others’virtual valuations. This
was achieved by informing the bidders in each round whether their valuations are below or above a
given threshold.
We illustrate the main aspects of our ascending auction mechanism with a brief description of
a common procurement practice, “request for quote” that shares many features with the present
mechanisms. We end with a short discussion of the role of the representation of information for the
disclosure process, and the interaction between the allocation problem and the disclosure process.
Request for Quote as a Sequential Disclosure and Bidding Process. The dynamic disclosure mech-
anism proposed has parallels to the commonly observed “request for quote” (RFQ) process in
procurement auctions for items with many attributes, see Beil and Wein [1]. In this process, the
buyer initially provides limited information about the object to the potential suppliers, which hand
in a quote. On the basis of this first stage, selected suppliers are invited who obtain further, more
detailed information about the product. In this procedure, the increased specification of the product
goes in parallel with negotiations over prices and the number of potential suppliers is reduced over
time until a winner is determined. Thus, in this sequential procedure suppliers learn more about
the specification (and therefore about their costs) and only those able to compete further remain
in the bidding process.
To illustrate, consider the following scenario. A firm that produces automotive and non-
automotive parts intends to procure a casting for one of its products. In general, many casting
suppliers are eligible to supply. The RFQ process routinely proceeds in several steps in which the
suppliers receive information about the part and are asked to quote an indicative price given this
information. Suppliers that quote prices that are not competitive are eliminated from the process.
In the first step of the procurement process, the purchasing firm may specify whether the part
is intended for automotive production or not. If, as typical, quality requirements for automotive
production are higher than for other productions, then suppliers that are not equipped for auto-
motive production learn that a significant investment would be necessary to be even considered
for the project. In a second step, the procuring firm announces general details of the project, e.g.,
required material. Most castings in automotive are either made from aluminum or steel and most
castings suppliers are specializing in one of these materials. Suppose the part in question is made
from aluminum. At this point suppliers that are specializing in steel would learn that they would
need further investments to be able to supply the part. Next, technical blueprints are given to the
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suppliers, containing specific technical information. Suppliers learn whether the part in question
is rather complex with many cavities or rather simple with just one cavity and thus whether the
machines that they already own are suffi cient to produce the required complexity. Next, the suppli-
ers are given further detailed requirements, e.g. exact quality requirements like “ppm”(parts per
million, a measure of the error rate of a part). At this point suppliers learn how much man-power is
required to set-up and supervise the quality of production of the product and whether they have to
hire more staff. The remaining suppliers can then improve their estimates of the cost of production
and determine their final bid.
The technology structure and the information process in this example can be formalized as
follows. The different characteristics of the object are given by a vector of dimension K, x =
(x1, ...., xK). Each characteristic k can take one of two values, xk ∈ {0, 1}. The different character-
istics are ordered in importance, as described in the example, e.g. x1 specifies whether the part is
intended for automotive parts or not, x2 specifies that the required material is aluminium and so
on. The buyer reveals the vector of characteristics in sequential order.
The technology of the potential supplier i can also be described by a vector of dimension K,
yi = (yi1, ..., yiK), where each entry yik ∈ {0, 1}. The cost function of the supplier is given by the
nested technology requirement and can be defined as a function of the length zi of the chain of
consecutive matches of characteristics xi and preferences yik :
zi = max
k
{0 ≤ k ≤ K | yil = xl, ∀l ≤ k} .
In particular, let ci(x, yi) = 1− zi/K. As long as the technology fits with the characteristics of the
object, the supplier does not need to incur additional (and prohibitive) cost in production facilities
to meet the requirements of the buyer. Thus, the failure to have a matching feature in step k
gives the final cost of production, and a success to match the current feature allows the bidder to
maintain a positive expectation of the true cost of production.
Disclosing Signal si versus Value Vi. In the present analysis, we restricted the seller to disclose
information contingent on si rather than Vi. We mentioned earlier that Li and Shi [18] recently
showed that by allowing the disclosure policy to be contingent on Vi rather than si, the seller
can sometimes increase his expected revenue. As Vi contains more information (about Vi) than
si, the seller has a better instrument, and thus it is not entirely surprising that the revenue may
improve. Li and Shi [18] consider the allocation problem of a single item to a single buyer. By
means of an informative example, their Example 4, they show that partial disclosure in the form
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of a binary partition characterized by single threshold can constitute the optimal static disclosure
policy. The threshold policy supports the sale of the object above the threshold V and no sale below
the threshold V . Interestingly, this static threshold policy is in fact very similar to the information
that the bidders receive at every point in time in our sequential mechanism. Here, the threshold
is increased in every round and thus the losing bidders learn that their valuations are below the
threshold at the moment at which they exit the process, but crucially the winning bidder receives
only partial information about his true value. We therefore suspect that if we were to compare the
static and sequential disclosure policies based on Vi rather than si, that the participation constraints
of the bidders would similarly be strengthened by a sequential disclosure mechanism. In fact, their
Example 4 has property that a sequential implementation with a single transaction payment and
no participation payment constitutes an optimal mechanism.9
The Limits of Sequential Disclosure. The sequential disclosure mechanism modifies the disclosure of
information in two important aspects relative to the complete disclosure of information in the static
mechanism of Eső and Szentes [10]. It discloses the information (i) partially and (ii) sequentially.
Crucially, the information remains only partially disclosed at the end of the mechanism. To wit,
in the auction, the revenue-maximizing allocation can be realized with limited knowledge of the
true value of the winning bidder. All that is needed is the information that the winning bidder
has a value higher than all the losing bidders (or in the case of single buyer that his valuation is
above the cost of the seller.) Thus, the sequential disclosure mechanism releases all the information
that is necessary for the assignment of the object, but not more, and hence supports the partial
disclosure of information. This also suggests the limits of a sequential disclosure mechanism. If
the allocation problem would be nonlinear - rather than zero or one - as in the classic quantity
or quality discrimination problems, then we would conjecture that the coarse information offered
by the sequential disclosure would not be suffi cient anymore to attain the revenue maximizing
allocation.
9We thank Xianwen Shi for suggesting the sequential implementation of their static disclosure mechanism.
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